TCP/IP Sequence Number Attacks
We'll consider a representative problem with TCP/IP by examining
how TCP/IP establishes sessions between endpoints.
A three-way handshake is employed in the TCP open sequence.
If machine A wishes to establish a connection with machine
B,
A transmits the following message:
This initial packet request has the synchronize sequence number
bit (SSN) set in its header,
and an initial 32-bit unsigned sequence number ISNa.
B replies with:
B->A : SYN, ISNb, ACK(ISNa)
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to provide its own initial sequence number, ISNb,
and to acknowledge ISNa.
A will finally acknowledge ISNb with
and the connection is established.
This session establishment is considered secure,
provided that the initial sequence numbers are so random that they cannot
be guessed.
If strictly conforming to RFC-793,
each TCP/IP implementation is expected to employ its sequence number
as a 32-bit counter, modified every 4usec.
CITS3002 Computer Networks, Lecture 11, Security of TCP/IP, p9, 15th May 2024.
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